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Antitrust authorities of many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition policies 
based on economic analysis. Recently an anti-cartel policy called a “leniency program” has been 
introduced in many countries as an effective policy to dissolve cartels. In this paper, we studied 
several kinds of leniency programs through laboratory experiments. We experimentally controlled 
for two factors: 1) cartel size: the number of cartel members in a group, small (two-person) or large 
(seven-person), 2) schedule of reduced fine: the number of firms that are given reduced fines. The 
experimental results showed that (1) an increase in the number of cartel members in a group 
increased the number of cartels dissolved, (2) changing the coverage of reduced fine had no 
significant effect both in two-player case and in seven-player case.   
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Introduction 
Cartels, collusions among competing firms, harm the social welfare of consumers by 
restricting competition in markets. Such market restrictions include entry barriers, 
market–dividing activities, price fixing, and volume controlling. The major role of 
antitrust authorities (referred to hereafter as AA) is to restrain cartels. For example, the 
Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) made recommendations for 15 cases of price 
fixing cartels and bid riggings in fiscal year 2003. Surcharge orders, which are legal 
means to confiscate excessive profits created by cartels, were imposed on 468 firms and 
the total amount of the surcharges amounted to 3.9 billion yen in fiscal year 2003. 
Between fiscal years 1994 and 2003, JFTC took formal actions in 279 cases with a total 
of 5798 firms. An international trend is one of strengthening fines and surcharges. For 
example, JFTC submitted a major amendment to the Japanese Antimonopoly Act to the 
Diet in 2004. The essential features of the revisions are that the basic surcharge rate 
shall be increased from 6% to 10% and that a leniency program shall be introduced to 
the surcharge system.
1  Lowe describes EU’s future fine policy as follows: 
 
The trend is clearly one of increasing fines, in order to achieve a genuine 
dissuasive effect on firms. In 2001, the heaviest individual fine yet, 462 million 
euros, was imposed against Hoffman-LaRoche in the Vitamins case. In 2002, the 
second highest amount ever, 250 million euros, was imposed against Lafarge for 
its participation in the Plasterboard cartel. Other significant fines were those 
imposed on the BPB, also in Plasterboard, 139 million euros and 118 million 
                                                  
1  According to the JFTC’s annual reports. A formal action means recommendations or surcharge 
payment orders without cease and desist orders preceding.   - 2 -
euros for Degussa for its role in the Methionine conspiracy.
2 
 
In order to raise the probability of detecting cartels, the leniency program has been 
implemented in many countries, such as the EU, the US, Canada, Australia, Korea. 
They have proven that the program is a very effective device to detect cartels. In the 
EU, between 1996 and 2002, more than 80 firms cooperated with the EC Commission 
under the leniency scheme and out of a total of 24 decisions imposing fines, firms in 17 
cases cooperated with the Commission under the leniency scheme.
3 That is, the 
number of cartels caught has increased dramatically under the leniency program.   
A typical leniency program is carried out in the following way. If a member of a 
cartel group resigns from the cartel and reports himself to the AA with sufficient 
evidence of his cartel activity sooner than other cartel members, then his firm will be 
given full leniency and will be exempted from paying a fine at all. Many countries’ 
AAs give “moderate leniency” (reduced fine) to firms that were not the first reporters 
so that the authorities can get more hidden cartel information from those cartel 
members, too. By introducing the program, cartel members might compete with each 
other to reveal the evidence of their illegal activity to the AA to get the highest leniency. 
If this is true, then the leniency program has the advantage of increasing the probability 
of finding cartel activities without increasing enforcement costs.   
Although there are some theoretical studies on various kinds of leniency programs 
using repeated game theory (e.g. Motta and Polo (2003), Hinloopen (2002)), to our 
knowledge, Apesteguia et al. (2003) is the only paper based on laboratory  experiments.   
Hinloopen (2002) theoretically analyzed European style leniency programs. In the 
                                                  
2  See Lowe (2003). 
3  See Monti (2002).   - 3 -
European style leniency programs, a fine is considered to be proportional to gross 
annual sales of a firm (maximum fine up to 10% of total sales). Hinloopen showed that 
it is highly unlikely for a cartel member to report information to the AA unless the 
probability of detection and/or a fine are unrealistically high. Brisset and Thomas 
(2002) obtained very similar results in the simplified first price auction settings. 
Compared with the European leniency program, Spagnolo (2000) proved that 
courageous leniency programs, which give reward to self-reporting firms, may deter 
collusion completely and costlessly.   
Apesteguia et al. (2003) investigated leniency programs in a one-shot Bertrand 
competition framework theoretically and experimentally. They compared several 
variations of leniency programs including courageous leniency program proposed a la 
Spagnolo, and found that the rate of cartel formation was the highest in the case that a 
reward was provided for the action of reporting, which contradicts the theoretical 
predictions. 
In this paper, we also studied the enforcement of competition policy against 
collusion under two kinds of leniency programs in laboratory settings. Since only 
unilateral deviations from the equilibrium are to be considered according to the Nash 
equilibrium concept, the equilibrium predictions in the two-person game models used 
in previous studies can be applied to the case where the game consists of more than 
two players, and the case where the coverage of reduced fine is limited only to the first 
reporting firm. However, we are not sure whether these predictions are true in real 
situations. If every firm involved in a cartel activity can give legally sufficient cartel 
information to the AA, the cartel can be dissolved easily just by prosecuting one firm. 
That might make each cartel member rely less on collusion as the number of cartel   - 4 -
members increases. In addition, cartels might be dissolved much faster with the 
leniency program than without it, since if a firm reports the cartel information to the 
AA, they can avoid a considerable fine when the cartel is detected by the AA. 
Furthermore, such a deviation from collusion could be accelerated if only the first 
reporting firm can avoid the fine and others get a penalty. 
To investigate these institutional design issues, we must consider what are the 
crucial variables that the AA can manipulate to prevent firms from forming cartels.  
The variables the AA can control but firms can not are the probability of investigation 
and the level of the surcharge or fine. Those variables can influence the incentive of 
firms for cartel formation greatly. If the probability of being caught and the fine are 
very low (or high), firms believe that the expected profits that they could gain from the 
cartel would be greater (or smaller) than the expected losses from being caught.   
Based on the considerations above, we experimentally controlled the following two 
factors to compare several institutional designs of leniency programs in a simplified 
oligopoly market: 
 
(1) Cartel group size: the number of cartel members in a group is either small (two 
members) or large (seven members),   
(2) The schedule of reduced fine: the number of firms that are given reduced fines is 
either only the first reporter or all firms that report the cartel information.   
 
The model in our experiments is as follows. First, the probability of being 
investigated by the AA is common knowledge among firms. Each cartel member 
colludes in an N-person prisoners’ dilemma game first, and then, they voluntarily and   - 5 -
independently decide whether or not to report the cartel information to the AA. If at 
least one player in a group reports the information, then their collusion in the prisoners’ 
dilemma is revealed to the AA with certainty, and all but the players who reported the 
information suffer the full fine (F), and the players who reported the information suffer 
only a reduced fine (R (< F)). Even if no one in a group reports the cartel information, 
the collusion is detected by the AA with the probability (p), and every member of the 
group suffers the full fine if the collusion is detected.     
Although it is very important to investigate whether people would collude in the 
beginning under the leniency programs, the issue we deal with here is limited only to 
how the leniency program works under the situation where firms already collude with 
each other.
4 To make our subjects understand that sustaining a cartel is the most 
profitable for them, they experienced the mutually cooperative outcome of the 
prisoners’ dilemma game for a sufficient number of periods. Then, we ran two 
treatments with leniency programs. 
The experimental results showed that (1) the large size cartel is more easily 
dissolved than the small size cartel; (2) the schedule of leniency (all reporters can get 
leniency or only the first reporter can) does not affect the likelihood of cartel formation. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The theoretical model we used in our 
experiment is explained in the next section. Our experimental design and procedures are 
explained in section 3, and experimental results are discussed in section 4. Finally, 
conclusions are given in section 5. 
 
                                                  
4  There is a vast number of experimental studies on the prisoners’ dilemma. Whether people are 
cooperative or not in the game is not the issue we deal with here. What we focus on in this study is 
whether firms which already commit themselves strongly to a cartel activity would really use the 
leniency program or not.     - 6 -
2. Model 
 
In our experiment, we used the following two-person prisoner’s dilemma repeated game 
as a baseline game that represents a simple oligopoly market. Table 1 shows the payoff 
matrix. The N-person case is analogous to the two-person case.   
 
Table 1 is here 
 
In the prisoner’s dilemma game, each player receives  C π  when they mutually 
cooperate (play Cooperate) and  D π  when they mutually defect (play Defect). The 
player who defects receives  DC π   when the counterpart cooperates and the counterpart 
receives  CD π . The condition,  DC π > C π > D π > CD π , guarantees that mutual defection is 
the only equilibrium (the dominant strategy) in the one-shot game. 
Now we introduce the leniency program into the baseline game above by 
introducing the antitrust authority (AA). The AA investigates each player to find 
evidence of collusion. We assume that the AA monitors each player with probability, p. 
When the AA discovers evidence of collusion, both players suffer the full fine, F. If the 
leniency program is available to the players, each player can report voluntarily and 
independently the collusion information to the AA. If one player reports the   
information, the other player suffers the full fine, F, and the player who reported suffers 
a reduced fine, R < F. Once the collusion is detected, both players fall under the AA’s 
control, and they are not allowed to collude anymore.   
In our experiment, all players were forced to mutually collude with each other in the 
first stage of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Then they decided voluntarily and   - 7 -
independently whether they would like to report the collusion information to the AA or 
not.  
Let us consider the incentive conditions for sustaining the collusion. Although all 
players are forced to collude in the first stage (prisoners’ dilemma game) in our settings, 
we explain the incentive structure including the case that players can defect in the first 
stage. There are two kinds of deviations from mutual cooperation. One is a deviation in 
the first stage (not colluding) and the other is a deviation in the second stage (reporting 
the collusion information to the AA). We assume that both players employ the following 
trigger strategy: each player maintains collusion (first stage and second stage) as long as 
the other player does so. However, if one player deviates from the collusion either in the 
first stage or in the second stage, the other player will never collude with that player 
again. Based on this trigger strategy, we can calculate the expected payoffs for four 
possible strategies: (1) colluding and not reporting, (2) colluding and reporting, (3) not 
colluding and not reporting, (4) not colluding, and reporting. We can examine what the 
incentive conditions are for sustaining the collusion in an ordinary repeated game 
analysis. In the following discussion, we examine whether a player has an incentive for 
unilateral deviation by comparing expected payoffs of the four cases above under the 
condition that his counterpart chooses the strategy of colluding and not reporting. 
 
(1) The expected payoff for the colluding and not reporting strategy ( CNR π ) 
 
In this case, a player does not defect in both the first stage and the second stage. 
However, if the pair is investigated by the AA with probability p, both players suffer the 
full fine F and they can not collude again any more in all the periods thereafter. On the   - 8 -
other hand, if the pair is not investigated by the AA (the probability= ) 1 ( p − ), they can 
continue to collude in the next period, too. Therefore, the expected payoff for this 
strategy with the discount factor  ) 1 0 ( < < δ δ   is as follows. 
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(2) The expected payoff for the colluding and reporting strategy ( CR π ) 
 
In this case, a player defects in the second stage. Even if the pair is investigated by 
the AA, the defecting player receives a reduced fine, R, while the other player suffers 
the full fine, F. The pair can not collude in all the periods thereafter. Therefore, the 
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(3) The expected payoff for the not colluding and not reporting strategy ( NCNR π ) 
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(4) the expected payoff for the not colluding and reporting strategy ( NCR π ) 
 
In this case as well, no collusion occurs. Therefore, the expected payoff is the same 
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From the all the calculations above,  NCNR NCR CR CNR π π π π , , ≥  are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for each player to sustain the collusion (colluding and not 
reporting) if the other player also chooses the same strategy. In our experimental setting, 
CNR π equals about 157,  CR π  equals about 115,  NCNR π  and  NCR π  equal about 140. 
Since only unilateral deviation from equilibrium is considered according to the Nash 
concept, these conditions can be applied to not only the game which consists of two 
people but also the game which consists of more than two people. In addition, the 
conditions can be applied to the case that the schedule of coverage of reduced fee is 
limited to only the first reporting player.   
In our experiments, we set the parameters so as to satisfy the condition that 
sustaining the collusion is an equilibrium. Therefore, in our experiment, we can expect 
subjects to use the colluding and not reporting strategy in both two-person and   - 10 -
seven-person cases.
5  The following is the first null hypothesis to be investigated in our 
experiment. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The colluding and not reporting strategy is observed in the 
two-person case as frequently as in the seven-person case. 
 
In the previous theoretical literature, only two-person games are considered. Under 
the leniency program, however, one may expect that the larger the number of colluding 
members, the larger the probability that at least one member of the group deviates from 
the collusion, even if such a probability for each member is small. Further, such a 
deviation from the collusion could be accelerated if only the first member who reports 
the collusion information is given a reduced fine because each player may rush to get a 
reduced fine. To pursue such an institutional design issue, we compared different 
schedule types of reduced fine. One schedule is that only the first reporter can get a 
reduced fine. The other schedule is that all members that report the collusion 
information are given a reduced fine. Therefore, the next null hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The rate of collusion is not significantly different between the case 
that only the first reporting player is given a reduced fine and the case that all reporting 
players are given a reduced fine. 
 
                                                  
5  These incentive conditions cannot exclude other equilbria. Our game can be reduced to a kind of 
stag-hunt game in which both “colluding and reporting” and “colluding and not reporting” are 
equilibria. We set payoffs in the first stage prisoner’s dilemma game so that not reporting is a payoff- 
dominant and risk-dominant equilibrium and reporting is not a risk-dominant equilibrium. Therefore, 
colluding and not reporting is considered as a plausible equilibrium in our experiment.   - 11 -
Based on this theoretical model and these behavioral hypotheses, we conducted a 




Four sessions were conducted at Kyoto Sangyo University in 2004. One session is for 
the case with two player groups and three sessions were for the case with seven player 
groups. In each session, three treatments were ran sequentially. The first session 
consisted of eight periods of prisoners’ dilemma game to make subjects understand that 
sustaining collusion is the most profitable outcome (players had to collude). Each 
treatment of the following two treatments consisted of five games that include various 
numbers of periods (each game was continued with probability of 0.8). Twenty eight 
subjects participated in each session (fourteen groups for the session of two-person 
groups and twelve groups for the three sessions of seven-person groups). Subjects were 
paid individually in cash according to their experimental results. No subject participated 
in more than one session. Our experimental subjects were recruited from various majors 
at Kyoto Sangyo University.   
The experimental procedures were programmed and conducted on z-Tree 
(Fischbacher (1999)) with computers with a network connection. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to a booth with partitions in front and on both sides of the desk in the 
laboratory. It was impossible for them to make direct contact, i.e., by talking, making 
eye contact, with other subjects during the session.   
The instructor distributed the written instructions to the subjects and read them 
aloud to make all the parameters and rules of the experiment common knowledge   - 12 -
among subjects.
6  To make subjects understand the instructions clearly, practice periods 
were run before the actual experiment started.
7 Before the actual session started, 
subjects practiced clicking their mouses according to the experimenter’s directions to 
get used to how to manipulate the computers and how to understand the information 
shown on the screen for their decision making. They were not allowed to make any free 
decisions until the actual period started. Table 2 summarizes all the treatments.   
 
Table 2 is here 
 
At the beginning of each session, subjects were told that they were going to 
experience three kinds of treatments and the result of the first treatment would be paid 
for certain but only one of the results of the other two treatments would be paid by 
choosing one of them by lottery at the end of all three treatments. The experimenter read 
the instructions for each treatment at the beginning of each treatment, so subjects were 
not aware of the details of each treatment until just before the treatment began. 
Therefore, there was no incentive for subjects to sacrifice their profits in one treatment 
in order to make higher profits in a later treatment.
8 All subjects were restricted to 
colluding in the first stage in the second and third treatments. In the second stage of the 
treatments, they decided whether to report the colluding activity to the AA. At the end 
of each period, individual decisions of intra-group members were revealed to each 
                                                  
6  The experiment instructions are available upon request. 
7  A practice treatment was run before the second and the third treatments since the first treatment is 
not complex at all.   
8  However, since subjects could learn how cooperative others are in the second treatment, the result 
in the third treatment is not completely independent from the result of the previous treatment in a 
rigorous sense. We assume they can be treated as independent data in our analysis.       - 13 -
player, plus whether the collusion activity in their group was found by the AA or not.
9 
However, the identities of subjects and where they sat were kept confidential to 
guarantee anonymity among subjects.   
      The second treatment was the case that all players who report the information could 
get a reduced fine. In this treatment, subjects played with the same group members for 
five sessions in sequence.   
The third treatment was the case that only the first player who reported the 
information could get a reduced fine. As in the second treatment, subjects played with 
the same partner (two-person group case) or same group members (seven-person group 
case) for five sessions in sequence. Within each session, the number of repetitive 
periods was not known beforehand since each session was ended with probability of 
8 . 0 = δ .  
All sessions lasted about two hours. During the experiments, subjects’ earnings were 
represented by points. They were told in the instructions that one point would be 
exchanged for five yen at the end of the experiment. The average payment for subjects 
in the two-person group experiment was 4,972 yen (about 45 US dollars), and the 
average payment in the seven-person group experiment was 3,490 yen (about 32 US 




                                                  
9  We did not tell subjects that the experiment was about anti-cartel policy. Instead of telling them 
that a cartel formation of their group was discovered by the AA, we simply told them that their group 
had drawn a payoff reduction lottery. We did not use any terms such as cooperation, defection, 
reporting and not reporting, but more neutral terms, such as A or B (in the first stage), choose C or D 
(in the second stage).   - 14 -
To verify the two hypotheses described at the end of section 2, we estimated the 
following logistic regression model by using data pooled from the two-person and 
seven-person cases. 
 
] [ ) 1 ( Pr 3 2 1 0 Game Leniency Group F Dissolve ob ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = = β β β β ……………(5) 
 
Dissolve is a response variable, which is 1 when at least one group member deviates 
from the collusion and 0 otherwise. Group is a dummy variable, which is 1 for the 
seven-person case and 0 for the two-person case. Leniency is a dummy variable, which 
is 1 when all who report are given reduced fines and 0 when only the first player who 
reports is given a reduced fine. Game is the number of games, and F is a logistic 
function. The estimated coefficients and other statistical information are shown in Table 
3. 
 
Table 3 is here 
 
From Table 3, one can see that the coefficients for Constant, Group are significant 
(p<0.10). The coefficient of Group is significantly positive, which indicates that the rate 
of cartel dissolution is significantly higher in the seven-person case than in the 
two-person case. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. The coefficient for Leniency is not 
significant, which means that the schedule of leniency does not have a strong impact on 
people’s behavior in our experimental parameters. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is not rejected. 
From this result, we can conclude that limiting the number of firms which can enjoy the 
leniency program does not have significant impact on the ability of collusive firms to   - 15 -
maintain their collusion. The main results of our experiments are summarized below.
10 
 
Result 1: The (colluding and) not reporting strategy was observed more frequently 
in the two-person case than in the seven-person case. 
 
Result 2: The rate of cartel dissolution was not significantly different between the 
case that only the fastest reporter can use the leniency program and the case that all 
reporters are allowed to use the program. 
 
Besides these results, one can ask whether or not subject behaviors changed from 
game to game. Subjects could have gained enough experience and could have become 
familiar with our experimental environment as the games proceeded. The coefficient of 
Game is not significant, which means that there was no particular tendency or decay of 
collusion across games.   
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the time series data for the number of the groups 
sustaining collusion during the sessions in the two-person case session, and Figure 3-8 
show the similar graphs for the seven-person case sessions.   
 




We studied two kinds of leniency programs through laboratory experiments. It is 
                                                  
10  These results were confirmed by a chai-square test of independence.     - 16 -
expected that the larger the group, the larger the probability of cartel dissolution will be. 
In addition, the deviation from collusion could be accelerated if only one firm is given 
a reduced fine.   
Based on the predictions above, under a simplified oligopoly market, we 
experimentally controlled the following two factors to compare several institutional 
designs of leniency programs; 1) group size: the number of members in a group, small 
group (two members) or large group (seven members), 2) schedule of reduced fine: only 
the first reporter of cartel information is given a reduced fine, or all reporters are given 
reduced fines. 
The experimental results showed that (1) the larger the number of cartel members in 
a group is, the weaker their ability to maintain the collusion is, and (2) changing the 
schedule of reduced fine does not have a significant impact on firms’ ability to maintain 
collusion: limiting the number of firms which can enjoy leniency does not make people 
rush to dissolve their collusion by reporting.   
We can provide several policy implications from our experimental findings. The 
average size of a cartel in the real world consists of about six firms. Therefore the 
seven-player case in our experiments nearly corresponds to the real-world situation. We 
found that under the two leniency programs, most seven-member groups easily 
terminate their collusion. Therefore, we can predict that the leniency program could be 
fairly effective for regular size cartel groups in reality.
11 However, we did not run 
experiments for the situation without the leniency programs. By comparing the current 
                                                  
11 Leniency programs set up in the European Union in 1996 achieved some notable successes in 
prosecuting cartels. (see European Union’s Official Journal  Legislation (OJL)（98．1.21~03．
12.16）) From data of 31 cartels prosecuted between January 21, 1998 and December 16, 2003 we 
can obtain that the average number of firms forming a cartel is about six and by applying leniency 
programs the fines for cartel members are reduced by 10% to 100% according to evidence brought 
to AA.     - 17 -
results with the results without the leniency program，we can predict more precisely the 
power of leniency programs. In addition, the effect of changing the amount of a fine has 
not been investigated in this study. Hence, it is our future task to examine how severe a 
penalty is appropriate to prevent cartel formation.  - 18 -
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Cooperate  C π ,  C π   CD π ,  DC π  
Defect  DC π ,  CD π   D π ,  D π  
 
(Note)  DC π > C π > D π > CD π .  
In our experimental setting,  . 20   , 60   , 10   , 40 = = = = D DC CD C π π π π  
 




Table 2. Treatment details 
 
Sessions    
Two-person group  Seven-person group 
Treatment 1  No leniency programs 
Treatment 2 (5 games)  All players can get reduced fines 
Treatment 3 (5 games)  Only the first player can get a reduced fine 
Total subjects  28  84 
The number of groups (each session)  14  4 
Fines (F: fine, R: reduced fine)  F=40, R=5 
Discount factor  8 . 0 = δ  
 
(Note) Discount factor means the probability that each game is continued. Subjects were 




Table 3. Logistic regression on cartel dissolution 
 
(Note) We simply assumed those groups whose cartels were dissolved by lottery could 
have maintained their collusion if they did not draw the payment reduction lottery, 
which means that the anti-trust agency investigated those firms. 
Dependent variable: Dissolve (if a cartel is dissolved =1, otherwise=0) 
Number of observation =260,    Log  likelihood  =-112.23829 
Variable   coefficients Std.  Err.  z  p 
Constant  -1.24 0.45 -2.78 0.01     
Group (two = 0, seven = 1)  3.41  0.35  9.75      0.00 
Leniency (only the first one = 
0, all ones = 1)  0.18  0.34  0.51   0.61   
Game  -0.15 0.12 -1.20    0.23   - 22 -
 
Figure 1. Time series of the number of collusive groups when































Figure 2. Time series of the number of collusive groups when































s  - 23 -
 
Figure 3. Time series of the number of collusive groups when all players who report get




























Figure 4. Time series of the number of collusive groups when all players who report get





































Figure 5. Time series of the number of collusive groups when all players who report get
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Figure 6. Time series of the number of collusive groups when only the first player who




























Figure 7. Time series of the number of collusive groups when only the first player who





































Figure 8. Time series of the number of collusive groups when only the first player who
reports gets a reduced fine (seven-person case) -session 3
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